Apology for a Thin Dribble


Apology for a Thin Dribble
Sean Gabb
(1st August 2021)

There was a time when I would turn out thousands of words a week on politics. In the past year, I have slowed down. What used to be a gush of words has become a thin dribble. The reasons for this? One is that I have become busier than I could once have imagined with teaching the ancient languages. I have classes and private students all over the world, and I am often up half the night making unlisted YouTube videos on Greek and Latin grammar. The other reason still shocks me and ought to shock others. This is that I am, for the first time in my life, scared to write about politics. I find that I have an hour free of other duties. I open Word for Windows and start writing. Then I stop. I ask myself: “Will this get me into some kind of trouble?” Sometimes the answer is: “Yes—this will get me into trouble.” More often, it is: “I don’t know, but better safe than sorry.” The result is the same. I close the Word document and turn back to Livy or Herodotus or the editing of a video on the present participle in Latin.

How could I possibly be scared to say what I think about politics or culture or some other matter of public importance? I am a freeborn Englishman. None of the liberties I inherited from my ancestors has been abolished. Indeed, since 1998, these liberties have been formally augmented by the Human Rights Act, which gives a bias in law to freedom of expression, and positively compels all public bodies to respect freedom of speech. No doubt, if I want to speak uncharitably about people of different races, there are laws to restrain me. But, if I resent these laws, I have no wish to speak uncharitably about such people. On all other issues, the laws of my country tell me I have more solid legal protections of my right to free expression than my ancestors ever enjoyed. All this, and I sit wondering if my proposed sneer at the latest Coronavirus claims or yet another denunciation of the Great Satan America will get me into trouble. My reason for wondering and then not writing is that these apparently solid legal protections are of no validity against a new and rather scary kind of censorship that never shows up in the Law Reports.

A few weeks ago, there was a football match between England and Italy. I usually pay no attention to these things. This time, though, it seems that the management of the English team saw the chance of making propaganda for one of the current orthodoxies. The chance was mishandled, and the working class fans were left angry. Since there was no hiding from the fans of what was done, the regime media responded with hysterical denunciation of anyone who complained. The usual authority figures were pressed into service. The result was an orgy of virtue signalling. I will not bother quoting any, but my Facebook feed was stuffed with the sort of rhetorical abuse you would once have seen in Soviet Russia during the purges.

A further result was that anyone who stepped too identifiably out of line risked shadow punishment. According to The Daily Mirror, reporting just a day after the match,

Savills estate agents have suspended an employee after his Twitter account posted racist abuse at England’s players.

According to Sky Sports, reporting nearly a week later,

A university has withdrawn an offer to a student following racist abuse towards England players after the Euro 2020 final…

Now, I neither care about football nor understand the details of what happened in that match. My interest in what happened is that this is how dissent is mainly policed in modern England. Getting the police to put on ski masks and smash down doors looks too much like censorship. Outsourcing the job to Human Resources makes denial much easier. I suspect The Daily Mirror reported that first victim as a warning to everyone else. The real wave of sackings will not be reported in the regime media, though its scale will be known by word of mouth or from the reports on social media. The desired message has been sent out.

Earlier this year, I wrote a long essay on outsourced censorship. Because this was so long, hardly anyone read it. What I said, though, was that censorship has indeed been outsourced—offenders nowadays are more likely to get the sack than see the inside of a police station. The outsourced persecution of those disappointed football fans is just an extreme and peculiar illustration of the point I was making. It is extreme and peculiar so far as football is a kind of religion in England, and it would not do to allow an open discussion of what may have happened with those penalty kicks. Apart from that, there is nothing unusual about the denunciations. England has become a country where all dissent against the dominant opinion is dangerous. It is not legally dangerous. There is no official censorship of opinion, or not very much. Dissent is economically dangerous. Dissenters risk losing their jobs or businesses. They risk having their books pulled from distribution and their bank and social media accounts closed. Debate is being shut down on matters that, even a few years ago, were completely open.

I am a man of reasonably firm mind. For years and years, I went on the BBC to say what I thought on the issues of the day, and would laugh at the shocked reactions. I am now largely silent. For the moment, there will be no more incredulity about the environmentalist claims, no sceptical doubts about the nature of the Coronavirus claims or the efficacy of the vaccines, no more defences of the British Empire.

I call this a “new and scary kind of censorship.” To be fair, it is only new for me because of when I was born. By 1959, the old ruling class had lost legitimacy. Its efforts to guide public opinion were laughed at. I grew to manhood in a moral environment where I was free to say anything I wanted. Oh, if I had been some kind of white advocate, I might not have been so free. But I was not a white advocate, and nothing I said ever got me into trouble with employers or clients or any government or business organisation. If I had been born in 1859, I might have been aware of a very firm pressure to conform. Suppose I had been a schoolmaster in the 1880s, and I had spoken out for Irish home rule, or disestablishment of the Church, or a confiscation of the landed interest, or a republic, or birth control, or I had held any other of the unpopular views of the day, I would almost certainly have found myself out of a job and blacklisted from getting another. Instead, I grew up in a kind of interglacial, where one set of established views was no longer hegemonic, and no new set had yet replaced it. That has now changed. There are once more established views that it is dangerous to mock or denounce too openly.

I could argue that the old views were somehow healthy and the new ones are not. I see no point in that. I will instead say that just because something undesirable happened in the past is no reason for putting up with it now. The old pressures to conform were wrong. So are the new. And they are wrong simply because they are pressures to conform. I find myself at last appreciating a part of Mill’s essay On Liberty for which I never used to have much time. Until recently, I would insist that the only real oppression was by the State: all else was the working of private choice. If the authorities fined a man £5 for having sex with another man, that was outrageous tyranny. If his tastes became public knowledge, and he was unable to find work, that was merely unfortunate. This is, I still believe, essentially true. Indeed, I could argue that, without a State having centralised and corporatised powers of discrimination that ought to be  widely distributed, there would be no problem—or there would be a problem that was bearable. But these powers were centralised and corporatised a long time ago. They are now being used to achieve a uniformity of opinion outside the home in which the formal organs of compulsion have no obvious part. This is not the “tyranny of the majority” that worried Mill. I find it inconceivable that anything close to a majority could believe the insane drivel pouring from the regime media. Neither, though, is it the kind of oppression against which liberal bills of rights have traditionally been written. Because of this—

when society is itself the tyrant…, its means of tyrannising are not restricted to the acts which it may do by the hands of its political functionaries. Society can and does execute its own mandates: and if it issues wrong mandates instead of right, or any mandates at all in things with which it ought not to meddle, it practises a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression, since, though not usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself. Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough: there needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them….

(J.S. Mill On Liberty, 1859, “Introductory”)

We need protection indeed. But the protection we need is not yet another law telling the police to leave dissidents alone. We already have a stack of these, and they are protections against a threat that largely does not exist. The answer, I suggest, is an amendment to the anti-discrimination laws to outlaw discrimination on the grounds of what may be loosely called political opinion.

I say hardly anyone read my original essay. Sadly, most of those who did read it stand in the more wooden reaches of the libertarian movement, and these set up a cry that I had become a Communist. I was suggesting that private organisations should be coerced in their choices of whom and whom not to employ, and even in their choices of customer and supplier. I had abandoned the non-aggression principle. Here, briefly expressed, is my answer to these claims.

I run the Centre for Ancient Studies. This provides a range of tuition services in Greek and Latin. It is a sole tradership. As such, I reserve the unconditional right to decide what services I offer and to whom. If I dislike the colour of your face, or the status of your foreskin, or your tastes in love, or anything else that I may think relevant, it should be my right not to do business with you. It may be that only a fool turns away customers with money to spend, and I am not that sort of a fool. Even so, I do claim at least the theoretical right, and I ground it on my right to do as I please with my own. But I claim these rights as a human individual. A limited company is not a human individual. Whatever entrepreneurship may exist in them, these companies are artificial persons and creatures of the State. Their owners have the privilege of limited liability. That is, they have the right, in the event of insolvency, not to pay the debts of a company if these are greater than the assets of the company. If this were not a valuable right, there would not be so many limited companies. There are almost no large companies, and none lasting more than a single generation, that do not have limited liability.

This being so, limited companies benefit from a grant of privilege from the State, and are legitimate subjects of regulation by the State for as long as they are receipt of this privilege. No doubt, some forms of state regulation are bad in their objects, or bad as regards the means to their objects. But regulation is not in itself an aggression by the State. It follows that, whether or not we can get it, libertarians should not feel barred from demanding laws to prevent limited companies from discriminating against their employees on the grounds of political opinion, and to require them to do business with customers and suppliers regardless of political opinion.

I appreciate that I am asking for more than the regulation of limited companies. The anti-discrimination laws we have make no distinction between incorporated and unincorporated associations. Even so, the extension of these laws to cover political opinion would mainly affect only the larger limited companies. At the same time, there is an obvious and overriding public interest in the protection of political opinion. People are now scared to speak their minds. Whether intended or just revealed, this is part of the strategy. The reason why the collapse of both freedom and tradition is gathering pace is because no one dares stand up and protest. In the absence of protest, everything will carry on as it is. Given a restored right of protest, there is a chance of stopping the collapse. The only way to lift the blanket of fear that now lies over all but approved opinion is somehow or other to get a law making it clear that no one who speaks his mind can be loaded with shadow punishments.

“Somehow or other!” In a sense, I am making a fool of myself. I am asking the politicians to make a law against what they themselves may not be doing, but that has no effect on their main reason for being in politics, which is to fill their pockets. I am asking them to take on the entire mass of the non-elected Establishment. I am asking a lot of these people. On the other hand, the politicians still need to be elected, and that was the weak point in the Establishment’s plan to stay in the European Union. We had to spend four nears voting and revoting, but we did eventually get what we wanted. It is conceivable that, if enough of us call loudly enough for protection, some kind of protection will be granted.

Short of that, we are lost.

10 thoughts on “Apology for a Thin Dribble

  1. Article 10 of the Schedule to the Human Rights Act:

    [quote]”1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.

    “2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”[/unquote]

    It is loaded with caveats and exceptions and of little practical use in protecting actual free speech. I would go as far as to say that Article 10 is an anti-free speech law.

    A law stating that no limited company may discriminate against a natural or legal person on the grounds of political opinion could be easily rendered useless in much the same way.

    As a further demonstration of the point, section 10 of the Equality Act supposedly protects religious or philosophical beliefs, but this protection was qualified in a judgment given in the EAT case, Grainger plc v Nicholson [2010] ICR 360, in which it was held that section 10 protection should extend only to those beliefs that are “..worthy of respect in a democratic society.”

    • The Equality Act protects religious and philosophical beliefs rather well. It doesn’t protect political beliefs. The stuff about “worthy of respect” comes into a judgment on an earlier attempt to smuggle in politics under cover of philosophy. It isn’t as hopeless as it looks – except that the politicians won’t act to nudge things in the right direction

      • I think the 2010 Act should go altogether. It is a good indication that we do not have a Conservative government when they can’t bring themselves to simply repeal it.

        • Bear in mind that repealing the EA will not return us to the situation before the rise of these laws – so that white male heterosexuals would be able to reserve things for themselves again. The main effect of repeal would be to entrench discrimination by the new groups raised up by the laws.

  2. Anyway, never mind that. What we really want to know is when will the new Lord Protector, ‘Anthony Furlong’, be dishing out some punishments?

    • As Minister for Yorkshire, I propose that anybody who insults England’s Greatest County should receive six of the best. Dispensations may be allowed on written application to the War Secretary at his address in The Other County.

  3. Tyranny of prevailing belief: as you noted, Sean, many of these beliefs are minority beliefs, eg “some women have penises”. The problem is not so much the state, as the status-signalling preference of the upper middle class. The state, in so far as it has ever proscribed speech, did so as the tool of the upper middle class, which dominates politics. So the libertarian opposition to the state was always somewhat confused. Lady Thatcher was on the right lines with Clause 28. It would be great to proscribe all promotion of culture war topics in schools and on the airwaves, and to ban it in the workplace.
    Most of the laws on malicious communications are intended to prevent free expression. It would be better to just rely on the general law against criminal harassment, as long as the law is applied equally. If you send threatening messages to a black man on Twitter, it is criminal harassment, but so are the threatening messages Antifa send on Twitter to those on the Right. Harassment has a high bar legally, and requires a targeted campaign, but equally applied would be quite acceptable. Accusations of racism are in fact themselves criminal harassment.
    A small company should hire and fire and give service as they please. With larger companies, you could require the board of directors to seek shareholder permission for discriminatory policies. E.g. if your corner shop didn’t wish to serve blacks, that is their right under the Common Law. If Tesco chose not to do so, because the local branch manager didn’t like blacks, that would probably not be something the owners of Tesco, the shareholders, would approve of. So you could implement a libertarian policy while requiring the real owners, and not the managers, to set the policy. The result would be in most circumstances non-discrimination.

    • “some women have penises” is not any sort of belief.

      It is a fact made inevitable by a law that allows some persons born as men to become legally women whilst keeping their male genitalia.

      • A fact is something that is known or proved to be true, or even if false, believed to be true, as opposed to something that rests on the interpretation of events, such as an opinion.

        What you say is not a fact, in my view, rather I would say that legal transsexuals have adopted a status that rests on legal fictions and is regarded as an intermediary status in social reality, and is of no consequence at all in biological terms. In law, a transsexual woman may be a woman, but in social reality she is a man who declares himself to be a woman on some basis, and in biology, he remains a man no matter how strongly or loudly he protests otherwise.

        Each socio-biological term in a set – male/man and female/woman – implies the other. If one is genetically male, then this implies manhood (or nascent manhood), whereas if one is genetically female, this implies womanhood (or development thereof). The essential characteristic cannot be legally-ascribed, no matter how many Acts of Parliament and learned judgments say otherwise. The law can say what it likes, but in general we know what a man is and what a woman is. It’s quite recognisable and genetic sexing is ineradicable.

        As an aside, I accept that intersex people add a complication to the picture in that the intersex condition often manifests as secondary sexual characteristics that are inconsistent with chromosomal patterns, but that’s a very exceptional class full of all sorts of grey areas and confusion, and not what people have in mind when discussing this.

  4. I am surprised to see you write

    ” I am asking the politicians to make a law against what they themselves may not be doing, but that has no effect on their main reason for being in politics, which is to fill their pockets. ”

    because I thought you too sensible to think that.

    Politicians may well be attracted by the public position of being an MP or whatever but it is hardly a profession that will line their pockets except for those whose incomes outside politics would have been poor. Most MPs could earn more outside politics. Boris got more for a column a week in the Telgraph than for being PM. Though his rewards may come later!

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