By Richard Storey
The state, being a judicial monopolist, is an irrational system of government because of the self-contradictory violation of private property rights required to establish or maintain it. Praxeological jurisprudence and the doctrine of dialogical estoppel provide the rational framework to show that, where there is incentive for rational consistency in the law, estopping the activities of state government and, rather, employing private judicial services is the only rationally viable option. The state, qua adjudicator of and/or party to civil disputes, seeks to protect private property rights, yet it must violate these rights to maintain its territorial monopoly; therefore, it cannot rationally claim a right to prevent competitors providing judicial services or delegitimize any act by private courts to estop state activities. This would necessarily result in a performative contradiction – a rights violating rights protector is a contradiction in terms. Only private systems of governance, that is, private courts enforcing private law through voluntary interactions, can be consistent with the presuppositions of argumentation.
The conventional definition of a ‘state’ is a person or group maintaining a territorial monopoly of ultimate decision-making and, so, ultimate adjudicative power, even in disputes involving itself. As Hans-Hermann Hoppe put it, the state ‘allows no appeal above and beyond itself. Furthermore, the state is an agency that exercises a territorial monopoly of taxation. That is, it is an agency that unilaterally fixes the price private citizens must pay for its provision of law and order.’ This definition applies equally to states which exercise a separation of powers; an independent judiciary, for instance, is nevertheless an interdependent body of state government, exercising a monopoly of judicial services and receiving its funding from the same source of taxation. Read more
BY ILANA MERCER
Read the judicial rules for radicals issued by the United States Court Of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in affirmation of the ban on The Ban.
It follows the Executive Order issued by President Donald Trump, with the imprimatur of 62 million voters, to protect the nation from foreign terrorists entering into the United States. Read more
By ilana mercer
Donald Trump is the gift that keeps giving. The week is still in its infancy, but the president has already made Chucky Schumer cry, fired Acting Attorney General Sally Yates within hours of her acting up, and caused the Forgotten Man to go even harder for their president. This Trump accomplished by inadvertently exposing the Democrats as firmly in the camp of Hollywood harridans, tech execs, the immigration lawyers lobby, the global refugee industry; and in the grip of the international human rights octopus. Read more
All in all, the Supreme Court judgement on Brexit is, politically, for the best. The Brexit legislation is now near certain to pass through both Houses of Parliament within the next three weeks, and if it doesn’t there would be a General Election in April or May and both the Labour Party and/or the House of Lords would be obliterated for good. That fall-back position in itself might be a good thing. Read more
Observing the Supreme Court Brexit proceedings confirmed in my mind the minimal skills required to be a ‘lawyer’. The quality of the debate was abysmal and there was little focus on the straightforward actual issue in the case.
There was a definite flavour of what we routinely see in civil court proceedings. There is no proper ‘due process’ whatsoever. There is not and never has been ‘rule of law’ in the UK. We congratulate ourselves on our ‘rule of law’, but that’s just lazy wishful thinking. What we have is rule by judges, which is similar in its fundamental nature to the systems operating in the worst regimes in the world. Read more
We have had the four days of the Supreme Court hearing which is now over and the judges will not issue their written verdict until the New Year.
It has been four days of extreme tedium, full of highly-paid briefs over-egging the pudding with too many examples to prove a particular point, much irrelevant argument, a huge amount of referring to batch that and manuscript number this with frequent inability of all eleven judges being able to find the relevant document, and shameless toadying by the presenting lawyers with frequent references to cases that one or the other of the Supreme Court judges had presided over. Read more
About ten years ago, the Belgian philosopher of law Frank van Dun published a paper entitled “Concepts of Order.” In that paper he gives, among much else, an account of what he calls the convivial order. In this order, “people live together regardless of their membership, status, position, role or function in any, let alone the same, society.” It appeared in a book “Ordered Anarchy: Jasay and His Surroundings,” published in 2007 as a tribute to Anthony de Jasay. It has been preserved on the Internet on Anthony Flood’s website here .
Around the same time, the German-American libertarian philosopher Hans-Hermann Hoppe published a paper, “The Idea of a Private Law Society” . That paper outlines some of the institutions, which might maintain order and justice in societies without political states.
Recently, I re-read Frank van Dun’s work in this area, and I find it seminal. I was surprised and rather disappointed to find no evidence of anyone having tried to build on his framework in the intervening decade or so. So today, I’ll try to build on the theoretical ideas of Frank van Dun and the practical suggestions of Hans-Hermann Hoppe. I’m going to sketch a picture of how people might be able to live together, and resolve their disputes, without a state or a “sovereign.” Read more